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Abstract
In the last years, a series of side channels have been dis-
covered on CPUs. These side channels have been used in
powerful attacks, e.g., on cryptographic implementations, or
as building blocks in transient-execution attacks such as Spec-
tre or Meltdown. However, in many cases, discovering side
channels is still a tedious manual process.
In this paper, we present Osiris, a fuzzing-based framework
to automatically discover microarchitectural side channels.
Based on a machine-readable specification of a CPU’s ISA,
Osiris generates instruction-sequence triples and automati-
cally tests whether they form a timing-based side channel.
Furthermore, Osiris evaluates their usability as a side channel
in transient-execution attacks, i.e., as the microarchitectural
encoding for attacks like Spectre. In total, we discover four
novel timing-based side channels on Intel and AMD CPUs.
Based on these side channels, we demonstrate exploitation
in three case studies. We show that our microarchitectural
KASLR break using non-temporal loads, FlushConflict, even
works on the new Intel Ice Lake and Comet Lake microarchi-
tectures. We present a cross-core cross-VM covert channel
that is not relying on the memory subsystem and transmits up
to 1 kbit/s. We demonstrate this channel on the AWS cloud,
showing that it is stealthy and noise resistant. Finally, we
demonstrate Stream+Reload, a covert channel for transient-
execution attacks that, on average, allows leaking 7.83 bytes
within a transient window, improving state-of-the-art attacks
that only leak up to 3 bytes.
1 Introduction
Since first described by Kocher [51] in 1996, side channels
have kept challenging the security guarantees of modern sys-
tems. Side channels targeted mostly cryptographic implemen-
tations in the beginning [5, 37, 51, 69]. By now, they have
also been shown to be powerful attacks to spy on user be-
havior [36, 67, 81]. Moreover, in transient-execution attacks,
such as Meltdown [57] or Spectre [50], side channels are vital.
Side channels often arise from abstraction and optimiza-
tion [79]. For example, due to the internal complexity of
modern CPUs, the actual implementation, i.e., the microarchi-
tecture, is abstracted into the documented architecture. This
abstraction also enables CPU vendors to introduce transpar-
ent optimizations in the microarchitecture without requiring
changes in the architecture. However, these optimizations
regularly introduce new side channels that attackers can ex-
ploit [3, 10, 56, 69, 74, 80, 86, 89].
Although new side channels are commonly found, discover-
ing a side channel typically requires manual effort and a deep
understanding of the underlying microarchitecture. Moreover,
with multiple thousand variants of instructions available on
the x86 architecture alone [1], the number of possible side ef-
fects that can occur when combining instructions is too large
to test manually. Hence, manually identified side channels
represent only a subset of the side channels of a CPU.
Indeed, automatically finding CPU-based side channels is
challenging. Side channels consist of a carefully-chosen inter-
play of multiple orthogonal instructions that are syntactically
far apart from each other. Typically, they require instructions
that change an inner CPU state and others reading (leaking)
this inner state. In addition, many side channels rely on spe-
cific instructions to reset the internal state to a known one.
For example, the popular Flush+Reload side channel [101]
flushes cache lines to reset the state, fills a secret-dependent
cache line, and uses another cache access to leak the new
state. Identifying such an interplay automatically is notori-
ously hard, fueled by thousands of CPU instructions, their
possible combinations, and the lack of mechanisms to verify
the existence of potential side-channel candidates.
Automation attempts, therefore, have focused on particular
types of side channels so far. With Covert Shotgun and AB-
Synthe, Fogh [27] and Gras et al. [30], respectively, automated
the discovery of contention-based side channels. Their tools
identified several side effects of instructions when run simulta-
neously on the two logical cores, i.e., hyperthreads, of a phys-
ical CPU core. However, their approach does not generalize
beyond contention-based side channels. Moghimi et al. [65]
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considered the sub-field of microarchitectural data-sampling
(MDS) attacks. Their tool, Transynther, combines and mutates
building blocks of existing MDS attacks to find new attack
variants. However, they do not try to find new classes of side
channels, and only focus on cache-based covert channels.
In this paper, we present a generic approach to automati-
cally detect timing-based side channels that do not rely on
contention. We introduce a notation for side channels that
allows representing side channels as triples of instruction se-
quences: one that resets the inner CPU state (reset sequence),
one that triggers a state change (trigger sequence), and one
that leaks the inner state (measurement sequence). Based
on this notation, we introduce Osiris, an automated tool to
identify such instruction-sequence triples. Osiris relies on
fuzzing-like techniques to combine instructions of the tar-
geted instruction-set architecture (ISA) and analyzes whether
the generated triple forms a side channel. Osiris supports an
efficient search scheme which can cope with side effects be-
tween different fuzzing iterations, a challenging phenomenon
that is not present in most other fuzzing domains.
In contrast to CPU instruction fuzzing [20], Osiris does not
search for undocumented instructions but instead relies on
a machine-readable ISA specification. Such a specification
exists for x86 [1] and ARMv8 [8]. As these specifications
contain all ISA extensions as well, Osiris first reduces the
candidate set to instructions that can be executed as an unpriv-
ileged user on the target CPU. From this candidate set, Osiris
combines instructions and tests whether they can be used as a
covert channel. In such a case, the found triple is reported as a
covert channel, and thus also as a potential side channel. The
current proof-of-concept implementation of Osiris is limited
to finding timing-based single-instruction side channels in
an unguided manner. However, even such a simple setup in-
volves many challenges that require a careful design to enable
finding interesting sequence triples.
We ran Osiris for over 500 hours on 5 different Intel and
AMD CPUs with microarchitectures from 2013 to 2019.
Osiris found both existing and novel side channels. The exist-
ing side channels include Flush+Reload [101], and the AVX2
side channel described by Schwarz et al. [84]. Moreover,
Osiris discovered four new side channels using the RDRAND
and MOVNT instructions, as well as in the x87 floating-point
and AVX vector extensions.
In three case studies, we demonstrate that these newly iden-
tified side channels enable powerful attacks. Based on the
findings of non-temporal moves (MOVNT), we show Flush-
Conflict, a microarchitectural kernel-level ASLR (KASLR)
break that is not mitigated by any of the hardware fixes de-
ployed in recent microarchitectures. We successfully evaluate
FlushConflict on the new Intel Ice Lake and Comet Lake
microarchitectures, where the performance is on par with pre-
vious microarchitectural KASLR breaks from which almost
all stopped working on the newest microarchitectures. Fur-
thermore, with the detected side-channel leakage of RDRAND,
we show that we can build a fast and reliable cross-core covert
channel that is also applicable to the cloud. Our cross-core
covert channel can transmit 95.2 bit/s across virtual machines
on the AWS cloud. We use these side channels as a covert
channel in a Spectre and in a Meltdown attack to leak on
average 7.83 B in one transient window.
In addition to the practical evaluation of the side chan-
nels, we demonstrate that our new primitives can evade de-
tection via performance counters [19, 40, 48, 72], and even
undermine the security of state-of-the-art proposals for secure
caches [59, 76, 97]. Thus, this paper shows that side channels
are quite versatile, making it hard to build robust detection
methods that cover all possible side channels. We stress that
it is important to build automated tooling for analyzing the
attack surface to design more effective countermeasures in the
future. Osiris is a first step, and even when limiting ourselves
to single-instruction sequences, we show that many unknown
side channels can be uncovered automatically.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
1. We introduce an approach to automatically find timing-
based microarchitectural side channels that follow a
generic instruction-sequence-triple notation and develop
a prototype implementation1 for it.
2. We discover 4 new side channels on Intel and AMD CPUs.
3. We present FlushConflict, a microarchitectural KASLR
break that works on the newest Intel microarchitectures,
and a noise-resistant cross-core cross-VM covert channel
that does not rely on the memory subsystem.
4. We analyze existing side-channel detection and prevention
methods and show that they are flawed with respect to our
newly discovered side channels.
Responsible Disclosure. We disclosed our findings to Intel
on January 19, 2021, and they acknowledged our findings
on January 22, 2021. Moreover, we disclosed the cross-core
covert channel to AMD on February 5, 2021.
2 Background
In this section, we provide background for this work.
2.1 Microarchitecture
The microarchitecture refers to the actual implementation of
an ISA. Typically, the microarchitecture is not fully docu-
mented, as it is transparent to the programmer. Hence, per-
formance optimizations are often implemented transparently
in the microarchitecture. As a result of the optimizations and
the abstraction, there is often unintended leakage of metadata,
which can be exploited in so-called microarchitectural attacks.
The most prominent microarchitectural attacks are cache-
based side channels [31, 37, 101] and transient-execution
attacks [50, 57, 79].
1Osiris’s source is available at https://github.com/cispa/osiris
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2.2 Side- and Covert Channels
Information is transmitted through so-called channels. These
channels are often intended to exchange information between
two entities, e.g., network or inter-thread communication.
Nevertheless, some channels are unintended by the designers,
e.g., power consumption or response time. Attackers can use
unintended channels to transmit information between two
attacker-controlled entities. We refer to such a channel as a
covert channel. Moreover, attackers can abuse the channel to
infer inaccessible data if a victim unknowingly is the sending
end. In this case, the channel is called a side channel.
Both side and covert channels exist in modern microar-
chitectures [28]. CPU caches are probably the most popular
microarchitectural components that can be abused for side
or covert channels [35, 37, 69, 101]. As CPU caches are
shared among different threads and even across CPU cores,
adversaries can abuse them in a wide range of attack scenar-
ios [36, 53, 57, 60, 64, 68].
2.3 Transient Execution Attacks
As modern CPUs follow a pipeline approach, instructions
might be executed out of order and are only committed to the
architectural level in the correct order. To avoid stalling the
pipeline, the processor continues precomputing even when
a branch value or a jump target is unavailable, e.g., due to a
cache miss. This is enabled through several prediction mech-
anisms that allow speculatively executing instructions. When
the branch target is evaluated, speculatively executed instruc-
tions are allowed to retire only in the case of correct predic-
tion. Otherwise, the speculatively executed instructions are
squashed. Instructions that are not retired but leave microar-
chitectural traces are called transient instructions [17, 46, 57].
Spectre [50] is one class of transient-execution attacks
exploiting speculative execution. By mistraining a branch
predictor, an attacker can influence the transient control flow
of a victim application. In the transient control flow, an at-
tacker typically tries to encode application secrets into the
microarchitectural state. Using a side channel, this encoded
information is later transferred to the architectural state. Melt-
down [57] is another class of transient-execution attacks, ex-
ploiting the lazy handling of exceptions. On affected CPUs,
inaccessible data is forwarded transiently before the excep-
tion is handled. Transient execution attacks commonly use
the cache to encode leaked secrets [17, 50, 52, 57, 61] but can
also use other side channels [12, 56, 80, 84].
2.4 Fuzzing
Fuzzing is a software testing technique that aims at finding
bugs in software applications [9, 18, 73, 78, 88]. A fuzzer
typically generates a large number of test inputs and monitors
software execution over these inputs to detect faulty behav-
ior. Due to the huge input space, fuzzers typically search for
inputs with a high probability of triggering a bug while avoid-
ing uninteresting input. Fuzzers usually follow one of two
different approaches for generating input [9, 13]. Mutation-
based fuzzers usually start with an initial set of inputs (seeds),
then generate further test input by applying mutations, e.g.,
splicing or bit flipping [9, 21, 41]. Grammar-based fuzzers
exploit existing input specifications to generate a model of
the expected input format. Based on this model, the fuzzer
efficiently generates accepted input [13, 38, 70]. Moreover,
fuzzing approaches can be clustered in two classes based on
how they generate new or mutated input. While blind fuzzing
randomly generates input based on a grammar of predefined
mutations [21, 39], guided fuzzing uses the current execution
to guide the generation of new input. These techniques aim
to maximize a given metric [9, 18, 73, 103].
Most research efforts on fuzzing target software applica-
tions. Nonetheless, hardware fuzzing is becoming increas-
ingly popular [20, 30, 65]. Sandsifter [20] presents a search
algorithm that allows efficiently finding undocumented x86
instructions. It applies byte-code mutation to generate new
instructions and checks whether the processor can decode
the generated instructions. ABSynthe [30] allows automati-
cally synthesizing a contention-based side channel for a target
program. It uses fuzzing to find instruction sequences that
generate distinguishable contention on secret-dependent code
execution. Mutation parameters in ABSynthe include instruc-
tion building blocks, repetition number, and use of memory
barrier. Hardware fuzzing has also been utilized to improve
existing Meltdown attacks [100] or find new variants of these
attacks [65], automate the search for Spectre gadgets [90],
and identify cross-core transient-execution attacks [77].
3 High-level Overview of Osiris
In this section, we introduce a notation that captures timing-
based side channels based on instruction-sequence triples
(Section 3.1) before we describe the design of Osiris. Side
channels not exploitable via timing differences are out of
scope for Osiris. We discuss challenges when using this new
notation to find side channels (Section 3.2). Finally, we show-
case the big picture of our fuzzing framework (Section 3.3).
3.1 Side-Channel Notation
For detecting side channels, we first focus on detecting covert
channels, as every side channel can also be used as a covert
channel. Regardless whether timing-based covert channels
are used as side channels or as covert channels in transient-
execution attacks, they follow these three steps:
(1) In the first step, the attacker brings a microarchitectural
component, abused by the attack, into a known state. For
example, the attacker might flush or evict a cache line (e.g.,
Flush+Reload, Prime+Probe, Evict+Reload) or power down
the AVX2 unit. We call this known state the reset state (S0).
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Table 1: Existing timing-based side channels mapped to se-
quence triples and whether our approach can find it ( ) or
cannot find it ( ). Reasons for failure are that multiple in-
structions are required ( ), side channel only works across
hardware threads ( ), or specific operands are required ( ).
Side channel Seqreset Seqtrigger Seqmeasure Osiris Reason
AVX [84] sleep AVX2 instr. AVX2 instr.
Flush+Reload [101] CLFLUSH mem. access mem. access
Flush+Flush [35] CLFLUSH mem. access CLFLUSH
Flush+Prefetch [33] CLFLUSH mem. access PREFETCH
BranchScope [25] cond. jump cond. jump cond. jump
Evict+Reload [74] mem. accesses mem. access mem. access , ( )
Evict+Time [69] mem. accesses mem. access mem. access , ( )
Prime+Probe [74] mem. accesses mem. access mem. accesses ,
Reload+Refresh [14] mem. accesses mem. access mem. accesses ,
Collide+Probe [56] mem. access mem. access mem. access
DRAMA [75] mem. access mem. access mem. access
Port contention [7] sleep execute execute (same HT)
S0 S1
Reset Seq. Trigger Seq.
Trigger Seq.
Reset Seq.
Figure 1: State machine representing different microarchitec-
tural states and transitions between them.
We call a sequence of instructions that causes a transition to
S0 a reset sequence (Seqreset).
(2) In the second step, the victim (or the sending end)
changes the state of the abused microarchitectural component
based on a secret. The victim might cache a value depending
on the secret, or power up the AVX2 unit by executing an AVX2
instruction. We call the new state the trigger state (S1). We
call a sequence of instructions causing a transition to S1 a
trigger sequence (Seqtrigger).
(3) Finally, the attacker tries to extract the secret value by
checking whether the abused component is in the reset state
S0 or the trigger state S1. This is typically done by measur-
ing the execution time of a particular instruction sequence,
which we call the measurement sequence (Seqmeasure). The
measurement sequence may—in fact, typically does—have
side effects beyond measuring, i.e., it also influences the state.
Table 1 shows examples of these three instruction se-
quences for several known side channels. For example, Flush+
Reload uses CLFLUSH as the reset, and memory accesses (e.g.,
via MOV) as trigger and measurement sequences. The careful
reader will notice that existing side channels often do not
require instruction sequences, but just a single instruction per
step—a simplification that we will leverage ourselves later.
Figure 1 shows a state machine representing the relation
between the three steps of an attack and the different microar-
chitectural states of the abused component. These two states
could represent an abstraction over possibly more complex
states of the component, e.g., different cache levels. However,
to mount a side-channel attack, it is sufficient to distinguish
and transit between two states only.
3.2 Challenges of Side-Channel Fuzzing
Based on this notation, we design Osiris, a fuzzer that aims to
automatically find new microarchitectural side channels. The
overall idea is to generate inputs, i.e., instruction-sequence
triples, and then detect whether such a triple forms a side
channel. For this, Osiris executes a triple and measures the
execution time of the measurement sequence. At an abstract
level, we compare timings with and without prior execution
of the trigger sequence. Large timing differences hint at side
channels. While the overall idea is intuitive, several challenges
complicate the search:
Unknown Sequences. First, as we aim for novel side chan-
nels, we cannot assume a priori knowledge of valid reset, trig-
ger, or measurement sequences. This poses a significant chal-
lenge to fuzzing, as we have to fuzz all three inputs without
knowing their relations. We are unaware whether an instruc-
tion sequence actually is a reset, trigger, or measure sequence.
Even if we find a sequence (e.g., a trigger), we do not know
which counterparts are required for the other two sequences
(e.g., corresponding reset and measurement sequences).
Unknown Side Effects. Second, sequences on their own may
have undesired side effects, such as measurement sequences
that change the state. For example, memory accesses within
the measurement sequence do not only passively observe
the memory access time, but they also change the cache state.
This implies that our state diagram becomes more complex, as
measurement sequences may in fact act as triggers themselves.
If we had a valid reset sequence, this would not be a prob-
lem, as we could revert this change. However, as mentioned
above, we do not know the corresponding reset sequence, and
therefore have to mitigate this problem conceptually.
Dirty State. Third, in the interest of efficiency, we want to
fuzz as fast as possible. This, unfortunately, means that a sub-
sequent sequence triple may inherit a dirty, non-pristine state
from its successor. For example, if the first triple contains a
memory access, the triple executed after that likely inherits the
cache state. In other words, we cannot assume that sequence
triples run in isolation. They do affect each other.
Generality. Fourth, we want to be as generic as possible and
cover the entire instruction set of a given ISA. That is, instead
of testing just a few popular instructions, we would like to
explore the entire range of instructions and their combinations.
To this end, we not only require knowledge of all instructions
but also a semantic understanding of an instruction’s syntax,
such as its operands and their types.
Indistinguishability. Finally, executing similar instructions
inevitably leads to similar, if not indistinguishable2, side-
channel candidates. In fact, we create thousands of sequence
2Indistinguishable side channels are those which lead to the same attacker
observation on system states.
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triples, many of which are close to each other. For example,
with reference to known side channels, dozens of instructions
use vector operations to power up the AVX unit. However,
regardless of which instruction is executed, more or less the
same side channel is found. Section 4 elaborates on how we
solved these challenges for Osiris.
3.3 Big Picture
Figure 2 shows the big picture of Osiris, a fuzzer that tackles
these challenges. In step 1 , the code generation stage, we
fuzz potential instruction sequences, i.e., triples of Seqreset,
Seqtrigger, and Seqmeasure. These sequences are generated
from a machine-readable specification of the targeted archi-
tectures. The generated triples are then forwarded to step 2 ,
the code execution stage. Here, the generated triples are exe-
cuted in a special order (at least) twice—once including the
trigger (hot path), and once without (cold path). We time
the measurement sequence (Seqmeasure) of both paths to see
if the trigger sequence (Seqtrigger) causes timing differences.
The timing difference is then processed in step 3 . This re-
sult confirmation stage interprets a large timing difference
as the first indicator of whether a given triple constitutes a
side channel candidate. On top of this, to address many of the
problems as mentioned earlier, there are additional validation
routines that sort out actual side channels from wrong candi-
dates. For example, we check whether (i) the reset sequence
has any effect at all to exclude a bad triple combination, and
(ii) a different fuzzing order confirms the result. Finally, in
step 4 , we feed the list of confirmed side channels to the
clustering stage. This step clusters similar, indistinguishable
side channels, to ease further analyses of the side channels.
4 Design and Implementation
Next, we discuss the implementation of Osiris for the x86 ISA
and how we solved the challenges enumerated in Section 3.2.
While we chose to implement and evaluate our fuzzer on this
architecture, the overall design is equally applicable to proces-
sors that use a different instruction set, e.g., ARM processors.
In the following, we present the implementation details for
the four stages outlined in Figure 2.
4.1 Code Generation Stage
The goal of the code generation stage is to produce triples
of assembly instruction sequences (a reset sequence Seqreset,
a trigger sequence Seqtrigger, and a measurement sequence
Seqmeasure). Since we are not aware of a clear feedback mech-
anism that can guide the creation of sequence triples, we
opted for the creation of random x86 instructions. To boot-
strap the code generation, we employ a grammar based on a
machine-readable specification of x86 instructions. The code
Table 2: Faulting instructions on Intel Core i7-9750H.
Signal Number of Occurrences
Segmentation fault (SIGSEGV) 118
Floating-point exception (SIGFPE) 22
Illegal instruction (SIGILL) 10 508
Debug instruction (SIGTRAP) 1
generation involves two phases: (1) an offline phase where all
supported instruction sequences are generated, and (2) an on-
line phase performing the creation of triples. The offline phase
is executed once for each ISA and consists of instruction cre-
ation and machine-code file generation. The online phase is
executed repeatedly for each run of the fuzzing process.
4.1.1 Offline Phase
The output of the offline phase is an assembly file contain-
ing all possible instruction variants for the target ISA. This
file is generated once and reduces the overhead required for
generating and assembling instructions during runtime.
Generation of Raw Instructions. The first task is the gen-
eration of all valid x86 instructions. To achieve this, we
leverage a machine-readable x86 instruction variant list from
uops.info [1]. This list extends Intel’s XED iForm3 with ad-
ditional attributes, e.g., effective operand size, resulting in a
large number of instruction variants per instruction. For ex-
ample, this list provides 35 variants for the mnemonic MOV
and 26 variants for the mnemonic XOR, summing up to 14 039
x86 instruction variants overall. The list also contains com-
prehensive information about each instruction variant, e.g.,
extension or category, that we later use for the clustering.
Creation of the Machine Code. The second task is assem-
bling the instructions to machine code. We try to reduce the
number of instructions by treating all registers as equivalent,
i.e., Osiris does not generate the instruction with all possible
register combinations. Osiris, w.l.o.g, relies on a fixed set of
registers as operands for each instruction. We also exclude in-
structions that change the control flow (e.g., RET, JMP) as they
may lead to an irrecoverable state. As branches have been
studied extensively for microarchitectural attacks [3, 4, 6, 23–
25, 50, 54], we do not assume that Osiris would find any
new side channels for these instructions. Finally, we add a
pseudo-instruction that allows idling the CPU for a certain pe-
riod of time. This instruction is required to reset components
that are based on power-saving features of the CPU, e.g., the
AVX2 SIMD unit. For each assembled instruction, the file also
stores a set of attributes, e.g., the ISA extension or instruction
category, that are used in the clustering phase.
3https://intelxed.github.io/ref-manual/xed-iform-
enum_8h.html
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Offline 1 Generation 2 Execution 3 Confirmation 4 Clustering
ISA Instructions Triple Generation Leaking TriplesRandomized Execution Clustering ReportTiming Measurement
Figure 2: Overview of Osiris. The offline phase extracts available instructions from a machine-readable ISA description. The
first phase generates sequence triples from these instructions. The execution phase measures their execution times and forwards
triples with timing differences to the confirmation phase. If the timing difference persists on randomized execution of the triple,
it is considered a side channel and forwarded to the clustering phase, which categorizes the triple and creates the final report.
4.1.2 Online Phase
When starting Osiris on a machine, the online phase first
removes instructions that are not supported on the microar-
chitecture, and then generates all possible sequence triples.
Cleanup of Machine-Code File. The first task is the cleanup
of the machine-code file generated in the offline phase. This
is required since the generated machine-code file contains
instruction variants for the entire x86 ISA, including all ex-
tensions. Hence, it contains a significant number of illegal
instructions for a given microarchitecture. Moreover, the file
may also include instructions that generate faults when ex-
ecuted by our framework, e.g., privileged instructions. The
cleanup process is done by executing all instructions once
and maintaining a list of all the instructions that terminated
normally. This process reduces the number of instructions in
the machine-code file considerably. For example, the number
of user-executable instructions for an Intel Core i7-9750H
is 3390, i.e., 24.1 % of the instruction variants initially gen-
erated in the offline phase. Table 2 shows the distribution of
faults generated in the cleanup process for this processor. The
majority of the faults (98.7 %) are illegal-instruction faults,
i.e., the instruction is not supported at all or not in user space.
Generation of Sequence Triples. The second task is the
generation of sequence triples from the list of executable
instructions that are forwarded to the code execution stage. We
exploit three observations that allow reducing the complexity
of this task as well as the overhead of the fuzzing process:
1. Most existing non-eviction-based side channels require
only one instruction in each of the sequences.
2. Idling the processor is used only as a reset sequence.
3. Trigger and measurement sequences may be formed of
exactly the same instruction.
Consequently, in our implementation, the triples are generated
by considering all possible combinations of single instruc-
tions, where the sleep pseudo-instruction is only used as a
reset sequence. While our framework is easily extensible to
support multi-instruction sequences, the search space quickly
explodes—a topic we thus leave open to future work.
4.2 Code Execution Stage
The goal of the code execution stage is to execute generated in-
put triples and analyze their outcome, i.e., determine whether
an executed triple forms a side channel.
Environment. The triple is executed within the process of
Osiris to not suffer from the additional overhead of process
creation. To reduce external influences, such as interrupts,
Osiris relies on the operating system to reduce any noise. First,
the operating system ensures that there are no core transitions
that influence the measurement by pinning the execution of
the triple to a dedicated CPU core. Additionally, this entire
physical core is isolated to ensure that the code is unlikely to
be interrupted, e.g., by the scheduler or hardware interrupts.
Setup. To measure the execution time of a triple, it is placed
on a dedicated page in the address space between a special pro-
log and epilog. The prolog is responsible for saving all callee-
saved registers according to the x86-64 System V ABI 2. The
prolog furthermore ensures that the triple has one page of
scratch space on the stack. Thus, there is no corruption if any
of the instructions in the triple modifies the stack, e.g., the
POP instruction. Furthermore, the prolog initializes all reg-
isters that are used as memory operands to the address of a
zero-initialized writable data page. This prevents corrupting
the memory of Osiris and ensures that executed instructions
access the same memory page. Note that the zero-filled page
is always the same, and the framework resets this page for
every tested triple. The epilog is responsible for restoring the
registers and the stack state, ensuring that any architectural
change is reverted. Moreover, signal handlers are registered
for all possible signals that can arise from executing an in-
struction, e.g., SIGSEGV. These handlers abort the execution
of the current triple and restore a clean state for Osiris. Fi-
nally, we abstain from parallelization, as this could lead to
unexpected interferences in shared CPU resources.
Measurement. Once the triple is prepared, Osiris executes
the generated sequence twice, once with the trigger sequence
Seqtrigger (hot path) and once without (cold path), as illus-
trated in Figure 3. In both cases, the execution time of the
measurement sequence Seqmeasure is measured. This code
aims to detect the existence of a side channel by observing
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Seqreset Seqtrigger Seqmeasure
Seqreset Seqmeasure Cold path S0
Hot path S1
Figure 3: The execution stage receives the triple and executes
Seqmeasure (cold path) and Seqtrigger, Seqmeasure (hot path) af-
ter Seqreset. Timing differences for the two paths are reported.
timing differences in the measurement instruction, depending
on whether or not a trigger was used. A significant difference
between the two measurements indicates a candidate side
channel that is then forwarded to the confirmation stage. To
ensure precise time measurement and no unintentional depen-
dency on the timing measurement itself, we add serializing
and memory-ordering instructions around the measured code.
4.3 Result Confirmation Stage
The goal of the confirmation stage is to validate if a triple
reported by the execution stage is an exploitable side channel.
To confirm or refute these candidates, Osiris further analyzes
the identified triples to rule out other side effects that could
have led to the detected timing difference. Such side effects
include unreliable reset sequences or a dirty state caused
by previous execution (cf. Section 3.2). To eliminate non-
promising candidates, we foresee the following mechanisms.
Repeated Execution. External factors, such as power-state
changes or interrupts, can induce timing differences. To rule
out such cases, Osiris executes the hot path and the cold path
(cf. Section 3.3) over a predefined number of runs to compare
the median of the timings for the two cases. In particular, this
check is passed if the difference between the two medians is
greater than a predefined threshold. The number of measure-
ments is a parameter that allows setting a tradeoff between
precision and runtime. While a high number of repetitions
takes longer, it increases the confidence in the result, as exter-
nal influences are statistically independent and thus average
out. Too few repetitions reduce the confidence in the accuracy
of the reported results, leading to false positives.
Non-Functional Reset Sequences. The initially observed
timing difference may result from different sequence combi-
nations leading to the desired state without actually perform-
ing the required transition. For example, consider a faulty
reset sequence Seqreset that does not reset the state to S0. A
timing difference would still be detected by the first check if
the test started in a state S0. To ensure the correct functionality
of Seqreset, Osiris measures the execution time of Seqmeasure
after the execution of Seqreset. It then measures the timing
after the execution of Seqtrigger followed by Seqreset. A negli-
gible difference between the two measurements indicates that
Seqreset actually resets the state to S0 when triggered to S1
by Seqtrigger. The check also implies that the state change ob-
served in the first check must be caused by executing Seqtrigger.
Consequently, the input formed of the sequence triple allows
reaching the target, i.e., it represents a potential side-channel.
Triple Reordering. Osiris executes all generated triples
shortly after another. We may therefore experience undesired
edge cases caused by dirty microarchitectural states and side
effects caused by prior executions. We therefore test each
sequence multiple times (twice in our evaluation), each time
randomizing the order in which we test the fuzzed triples. We
then ignore triples that do show discontinuous behavior in
all tested permutations. This reordering ensures that we have
a negligible probability that two given sequence triples are
executed directly after each other in both runs, hence lowering
the chances of repetitive dirty states being carried over.
Applicability in Transient Execution. Osiris also allows de-
tecting whether a side channel can be used as covert channels
for transient-execution attacks. To test the transient behavior
of the side channel, Osiris executes Seqtrigger speculatively
using Retpoline as shown in previous work [87, 98]. We opted
for this variant as it has a perfect misspeculation rate requiring
no mistraining of any branch predictors [98]. Osiris allows to
optionally enable this behavior in the confirmation stage.
4.4 Clustering Stage
Different sequence triples can lead to the detection of the same
side channel. For example, for cache-based side channels, ev-
ery instruction that accesses a memory address can act both as
trigger and as measurement sequence. Due to the CISC nature
of x86, many instructions explicitly (e.g., ADD) or implicitly
(e.g., PUSH) access memory. Additionally, every instruction
that flushes this address acts as a reset sequence. Similarly,
in the AVX2 side channel, different AVX2 instructions can act
both as trigger and as measurement sequence.
In the clustering stage, Osiris aims at clustering the input
forwarded from the code execution stage into groups that
represent different side channels. To achieve this, we can base
our clustering on various properties of the involved instruction
sequences. Examples of instruction properties include the
instruction’s extension, memory behavior, and the general
instruction category (e.g., arithmetic or logical). Additionally,
our tests showed that the timing difference tends to be an
important clustering property. This procedure assumes that
similar side channels show similarities in the properties of
the corresponding instructions. We identify two categories of
properties that can be used for clustering, as outlined next.
Static Properties. Triples can be classified based on proper-
ties of the contained instructions, such as the instruction cate-
gory (e.g., arithmetic or logical) or the instruction extension
(e.g., AVX2 or x87-FPU). As this information is propagated
from the instructions to the clustering phase, Osiris fundamen-
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tally relies on this information for clustering. The clustering
stage clusters the reported triples based on the instruction set
extension of Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure. The intuition behind
this clustering is that instruction-set extensions are strong
indicators for the underlying microarchitectural root cause.
Although this process cannot remove all duplicates, it signifi-
cantly reduces the number of reported triples, thus, facilitating
further analysis of the side channels.
Dynamic Properties. In addition to the static properties of
instructions, it is also possible to cluster triples based on their
dynamic effects. One of the dynamic properties Osiris sup-
ports for clustering is the observed timing difference. If multi-
ple triples lead to the same timing difference, the root cause is
likely the same, i.e., access-time differences when accessing
cached and uncached memory. Additionally, the clustering
stage may cluster the triples based on their cache behavior. As
shown by Moghimi et al. [65], performance counters can be
used for clustering triples. By executing triples while record-
ing performance counters, it is possible to dynamically ob-
serve which parts of the microarchitecture are active. This
can also help to identify the root cause easier.
5 Results
In this section, we evaluate the design choices of Osiris based
on the prototype implementation described in Section 4.
5.1 Evaluation Setup
We perform the fuzzing on 5 different CPUs and evaluate the
case studies based on our results on a more extensive set of
CPUs (cf. Table 4 and Table 5). We use a laptop with an Intel
Core i7-9750H (Coffee Lake), and 4 desktop machines with
an Intel Core i7-9700K (Coffee Lake), Intel Core i5-4690
(Haswell), AMD Ryzen 5 2500U (Zen), and AMD Ryzen
5 3550H (Zen+). All systems run Ubuntu or Arch Linux.
5.2 Performance
Before demonstrating Osiris’s ability to find side channels,
we evaluate its performance, i.e., the number of triples tested
per second. To measure this throughput, we first use the same
instruction sequence for Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure. For the first
measurement, we exclude the pseudo sleep instruction, as it—
by construction—biases the code execution time. We only
report the throughput for the oldest processor, i.e., the In-
tel Core i5-4690. For this microarchitecture, there are 3377
instructions (after cleanup), leading to a total of 33772 =
11 404 129 sequence triples. A full fuzzing run terminated
in just 41 s, resulting in a throughput of 278 149 triples per
second. To identify the bottleneck of our framework, we in-
creased the number of repetitions of each triple from 1 to 10,
i.e., executed more code. In this experiment, the fuzzer took
127 s to complete (89 796 triples per second), resulting in a
runtime increase by factor 3 only.
When including the pseudo sleep instruction, the overall
runtime grows to 56 s and 271 s for 1 and 10 repetitions, re-
spectively. That is, the throughput reduces to 202 370 triples
per second (or 42 044 for 10 repetitions). This is a 37 % slow-
down compared to the first run that excluded sleeping. Intu-
itively, sleeps imply that the fuzzer spends more time execut-
ing code. This explains the stronger impact of the actual code
execution on the overall throughput compared to code gener-
ation. Increasing the number of repetitions by 10x, therefore,
decreases the number of tested triples by a factor of 4.8. For
the actual fuzzing run, Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure are different.
Hence, the number of sequence triples increases to 33773 =
38 511 743 633, leading to a runtime of nearly 5 days.
5.3 Clustering
On the tested microarchitectures, Osiris successfully clus-
tered the reported instances into fewer than 30 clusters. On
the Intel i7-9750H, the 68 597 reported side channels were
first clustered into 186 clusters. To further reduce the number
of clusters caused by one side-channel variant, Osiris also pro-
vides the clustering based only on Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure, as
these sequences contain the instructions causing the leakage.
Based on these two sequences, the number of clusters is only
16. Table 7 (Appendix A) shows the numbers for other CPUs.
5.4 Rediscovering Known Side Channels
A typical test for software fuzzer is the rediscovery of old
bugs, e.g., by searching for vulnerabilities in poorly tested
software, checking for well-known CVEs, or uncovering bugs
reported by prior work. Osiris also rediscovered two well-
known side channels, Flush+Reload [101] and the AVX2-based
side channel [84], as described in the following. Section 7
discusses some of the known side channels Osiris did not
rediscover and provides the reason for that.
Flush+Reload-Based Side Channel. Osiris detects a total
of 18 799 triples that can be classified as a variant of Flush+
Reload. These triples have in common that Seqreset is in either
CLFLUSH or CLFLUSHOPT, and Seqtrigger is some kind of mem-
ory load. Interestingly, we also found a new variant of Flush+
Reload that uses MOVNTDQ as Seqreset. This store instruction
with a non-temporal hint also evicts the accessed memory
address from the cache [43].
Arguably, in a practical attack, this is not very useful, as
writable shared memory is typically not a target for Flush+
Reload. However, in the case of transient-execution attacks,
where an attacker often uses Flush+Reload as a covert channel
to transfer the leaked data from the microarchitectural domain
to the architectural domain, this alternative flushing method is
indeed useful. In Section 6.1, we show that the MOVNT-based
Flush+Reload can increase the leakage from 3 to 7.83 bytes































































Figure 4: Histograms of Seqmeasure execution time depending on whether Seqtrigger was executed (solid blue) or not (dashed red).
per transient window for Meltdown-type attacks, reducing the
impact of the Flush+Reload part that is often the bottleneck.
AVX2-Based Side Channel. Osiris also found 514 instances
of the AVX-based side channel [84]. For this side channel, the
Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure contain AVX2 or AVX512 instructions,
and Seqreset is simply idling. According to Schwarz et al.
[84], a busy-wait executing for around 2 700 000 cycles would
power down the AVX2 SIMD unit. However, our manual tests
showed that a busy wait of 8000 cycles is, in fact, sufficient.
Interestingly, we also observed during the manual inspec-
tion a variant of the AVX2 side channel that contains the PAUSE
in its Seqreset. Figure 4d visualizes the behavior of this new
variant for 200 000 executions. As shown in the figure, this
variant is, in fact, more stable than the variant based on busy
wait. In particular, we observed a difference of 226 cycles
between the medians of the two distributions, which is twice
the difference for triples that have a busy-wait as Seqreset.
5.5 Finding Novel Side Channels
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our fuzzer, we tested
its ability to uncover new side channels. After running our
fuzzer for 21 days, we automatically uncovered 4 different,
previously unknown side channels. Table 3 shows an overview
of the reported side channels. In the following, we briefly
present each of these side channels.
RDRAND-Based Side Channel. This side channel consists
of triples having the RDRAND instructions in both Seqtrigger and
Seqmeasure, and the sleep pseudo-instruction in Seqreset. Fig-
ure 4a visualizes the behavior of this side channel for 200 000
executions. We observed a difference of 228 cycles between
the medians of the two distributions. Setting a simple thresh-
old to the average of these two medians leads to a success
rate of 84.28 % when attempting to distinguish between the
two states S0 and S1. While it is unlikely that detecting the
execution of the RDRAND instruction leads to a side-channel
attack, we demonstrate in Section 6.3 that this finding can be
used for a stealthy cross-core covert channel.
XSAVE-Based Side Channel. This side channel consists
of triples having the XSAVE or XSAVE64 instructions in both
Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure. For this side channel, Seqreset can
contain various instructions. However, we distinguish be-
tween two variants: (1) a non-transient variant that contains
LSL, RDRAND, LAR, FLD, FXRSTOR64, or FXSAVE64 instructions
in Seqreset; and (2) a transient variant that contains XSAVEOPT
instruction in addition to most x87-FPU instructions.
Figure 4b visualizes the behaviour for 200 000 executions
of a triple formed of XSAVE [R8] in both Seqtrigger and
Seqmeasure, and LAR ECX, EDX in Seqreset. We observed a
difference of 158 cycles between the medians of the two dis-
tributions. Using the average of the two medians as threshold
leads to a rather unstable behaviour, though. We observe a
success rate of only 75.10 % when attempting to distinguish
between the two states S0 and S1.
MMX Combined with x87-FPU. This side channel consists
of triples having the MMX instructions in both Seqtrigger and
Seqmeasure, and x87-FPU in Seqreset. Figure 4c shows the his-
togram for 200 000 executions of the triples. The reported
triples have a time measurement difference of 90 cycles in the
median. We could reliably distinguish between the states S0
and S1 with an accuracy of 99.99 %.
AVX2 Combined with x87-FPU. This side channel con-
sists of triples having the AVX, AVX2, AVX512, FMA, or F16C
instructions in both Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure, and x87-FPU
in Seqreset. The reported triples have a time measurement
difference in the interval of 72 to 208 cycles.
Figure 4d visualizes the behavior for 200 000 executions
of a triple formed of VFMADD132PD YMM1, YMM2, [R8] in
both Seqtrigger and Seqmeasure, and FISTP [R8] in Seqreset.
We observe a difference of 166 cycles between the medians
of the two distributions. A threshold can distinguish the two
states S0 and S1 at a success rate of 99.95 %. In Section 6.1,
we show that this side-channel leakage can be used for a fast
covert channel for Spectre attacks.
6 Case Studies
In this section, we present three case studies based on the
newly detected side channels (cf. Section 5). Section 6.1
demonstrates that the newly discovered side channels can
be used for transient-execution attacks. They can be used in
Spectre attacks to increase the space of possible gadgets, as
well as in Meltdown-type attacks to increase the leakage. Sec-
tion 6.2 introduces a novel microarchitectural attack against
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Table 3: Overview of the novel side channels.
Side Channel Name Example Seqtrigger Example Seqmeasure Example Seqreset Timing Diff.
RDRAND RDRAND RDRAND Sleep Pseudo-Inst. 228 cycles
XSAVE XSAVE [R8] XSAVE [R8] LAR ECX, EDX 158 cycles
MMX-x87-FPU PHADDD MM1, [R8] PHADDD MM1, [R8] FLDLN2 90 cycles
AVX2-x87-FPU VDMADD132PD YMM1, YMM2, [R8] VFMADD132PD YMM1, YMM2, [R8] FISTP [R8] 166 cycles
kernel-level ASLR (KASLR) based on the results discovered
by Osiris. This novel KASLR break even works on the newest
Intel Ice Lake and Comet Lake microarchitectures, even if all
known mitigations are in place. Section 6.3 shows that the
RDRAND-based side channel can be used as a cross-core covert
channel in the cloud without relying on the cache.
6.1 Transient-Execution Covert Channels
Transient-execution attacks [17], i.e., Spectre- and Meltdown-
type attacks, always require a microarchitectural covert chan-
nel to transfer the microarchitecturally-encoded data into the
architectural state. Typically, these attacks rely on a cache
covert channel [17], as also shown in the original Spec-
tre [50] and Meltdown [57] paper. Cache-based covert chan-
nels have the advantage that they are ubiquitous, fast, and
reliable [17, 50, 57]. In this case study, we show that our new
side channels can potentially increase the number of Spectre
gadgets, and optimize the leakage for Meltdown-type attacks.
Spectre Attacks. Bhattacharyya et al. [12] and Schwarz et al.
[80, 84] already showed different covert channels for Spectre.
Their covert channels are based on port contention, vector
instructions, and the TLB, respectively. In this case study, we
show that our newly discovered side channel based on AVX2
and x87-FPU can also be used for Spectre attacks.
We implement a proof-of-concept Spectre attack that uses
this side channel as the covert channel. Our proof of con-
cept exploits Spectre-PHT [50] to leak a string outside of
the bounds of an array. We can use the same gadgets as in a
NetSpectre attack [84] and similar gadgets as used in SMoTh-
erSpectre [12]. More specifically, exploiting the discovered
side channels would require finding specific gadgets (con-
ditional trigger sequence) in the victim code. Such gadgets
could also be constructed in combination with other Spectre
vulnerabilities using speculative ROP [11, 12]. Depending on
the value of a transiently accessed bit, an AVX2 instruction
is executed or not executed. While NetSpectre simply waits
for the state to be reset, we rely on the findings of Osiris that
executing an x87-FPU instruction resets the state faster. The
receiving end of the covert channel is again an AVX2 instruc-
tion. We tested our code on an Intel Core i7-9700K, where
we achieved a leakage rate of 2407 bit/s with an error rate of
0.43 %. This is 2.4 times as fast as the transmission rate of
the AVX-based covert channel used in NetSpectre [84].
Meltdown Attacks. In Meltdown-type attacks, both the
sending and the receiving end of the covert channel are
entirely attacker-controlled. So far, all Meltdown-type at-
tacks [15, 17, 57, 77, 82, 87, 91, 93] relied on the cache
and typically on Flush+Reload to recover the information
from the cache. Even though Flush+Reload is extremely fast
and reliable, it is still the bottleneck for leaking data [57].
With Stream+Reload, we introduce a new cache attack
for improving the leakage rate of Meltdown-type attacks.
Stream+Reload is based on the discovery of Osiris that non-
temporal memory stores flush the target from the cache. While
a cache attack that requires shared writable memory is not use-
ful in a typical side-channel scenario, it is ideal as a fast covert
channel for transient-execution attacks. Stream+Reload re-
places the CLFLUSH instruction with a MOVNTDQ instruction.
The MOVNTDQ instruction has a similar effect as the CLFLUSH
instruction. It evicts the target cache line from the cache [43].
Reliability of Eviction. Using L3 performance coun-
ters, we confirmed that the MOVNTDQ instruction indeed re-
liably evicts the cache line from all cache levels. With
respect to the eviction reliability, there is no difference
between MOVNTDQ and CLFLUSH or CLFLUSHOPT. Both for
Stream+Reload and Flush+Reload, we measured an F-score
of 1.0 (n = 10 000 000). Furthermore, even novel cache de-
signs [59, 76, 97] likely do not prevent this type of eviction, as
they only block the flush instruction and prevent the efficient
creation of eviction sets.
Performance. We observe one significant difference
between Flush+Reload and Stream+Reload. Although in both
attacks, the value is evicted from all cache levels, the reload
of a value flushed using MOVNTDQ is significantly faster on all
our tested CPUs. On the i7-8565U, for example, reloading a
value when it was flushed takes on average 253 cycles (n =
20 000 000) (including an MFENCE each before and after the
memory load). In contrast, when the value was evicted using
MOVNTDQ, reloading only takes 172 cycles (n = 20 000 000).
Analyzing the uncore performance counters shows that this
time difference for loading the data originates from the uncore
(offcore_requests_outstanding.cycles_with_data_rd).
We attribute the time difference to the cache-coherency
protocol. Flushing the cache line puts the cache line into
the invalid state, while writing to the cache line puts it into
the modified state [66, 71]. When loading the flushed cache
line, it switches to the exclusive state, while the modified
state stays the same. Due to the different behaviors of cache
snooping, loading from different cache coherence states also
results in different latencies [66].
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Results. The faster reload time allows encoding 2.5x more
values during the transient window. In a Meltdown proof of
concept relying on Stream+Reload, we can, on average, leak
7.83 bytes at once (n = 100 000) (Intel i3-5010U).4 Previous
work was only able to leak up to 3 bytes [57, 65, 77, 82].
6.2 MOVNT-based KASLR Break
KASLR has been subject to almost countless microarchitec-
tural attacks in the past [15, 16, 24, 33, 42, 49, 62, 80]. As
a response, researchers, CPU vendors, and OS maintainers
have developed several countermeasures [2, 16, 29, 32]. In
particular, the newest 10th-generation Intel CPUs (Ice Lake
and Comet Lake) are immune to many microarchitectural
KASLR breaks, including the recently discovered EchoLoad
attack [16]. However, our newly-discovered side channel can
be used to break KASLR even on those architectures.
Based on the discovery of Osiris that the MOVNT instruc-
tion evicts a cache line, we manually evaluated whether this
eviction also works for inaccessible addresses such as kernel
addresses. Previous work showed that even for Meltdown-
resistant CPUs, memory loads [16, 92] and stores [80] can in-
fer side-channel information from the kernel. Although MOVNT
could not directly evict kernel memory, we observed changes
in the cache state on seemingly unrelated memory. If the tar-
geted kernel address is invalid, i.e., not physically backed, we
observe that an unrelated MOV on user memory issued after
the MOVNT fails. If the kernel address is physically backed,
the MOV is successful. Hence, this allows de-randomizing the




4 "movq %%rsi, (%[dummy])\n"
5 "movntdqa (%[kernel]), %%xmm1\n"
6 "movq (%[probe]), %%rax\n"
7 ) : : [probe]"r"(probe), [dummy]"r"(dummy),
8 [kernel]"r"(kernel)
9 : "rax", "xmm1", "rsi", "memory");
10 } catch {
11 if(uncached(probe)) return MAPPED;
12 else return UNMAPPED;
13 }
Listing 1: The main part of FlushConflict. The probe memory
is uncached if the kernel address is physically backed.
Listing 1 shows the minimal working example of our
KASLR break, FlushConflict, that we created from our find-
ings on MOVNT. A user-accessible memory address (probe) is
flushed, followed by a write to an unrelated address, acting as
a reordering barrier. Afterward, the kernel address (kernel)
is read using MOVNT. Finally, probe is accessed. As the load
4We used this older CPU as the new CPUs are not affected by Meltdown.
Table 4: The evaluated CPUs for the KASLR break.
CPU (Microarchitecture) Accuracy (idle) Accuracy (stress) Runtime
Intel Core i5-3230M (Ivy Bridge) 99 % 97 % 34 ms
Intel Core i5-4690 (Haswell) 100 % 99 % 221 ms
Intel Core i3-5010U (Broadwell) 99 % 97 % 5 ms
Intel Core i7-6700K (Skylake) 99 % 98 % 9 ms
Intel Core i7-8565U (Whiskey Lake) 100 % 92 % 6 ms
Intel Core i7-9700K (Coffee Lake) 100 % 98 % 102 ms
Intel Core i9-9980HK (Coffee Lake) 99 % 99 % 65 ms
Intel Core i3-1005G1 (Ice Lake) 96 % 96 % 300 ms
Intel Core i7-10510U (Comet Lake) 99 % 97 % 84 ms
Intel Celeron J4005 (Gemini Lake) 99 % 99 % 349 ms
Intel Xeon Platinum 8124M (Skylake-SP) 99 % 99 % 318 ms
from the kernel address leads to a fault, exceptions are han-
dled using a signal handler for this code. After resolving the
fault, the cache state of probe is observed, e.g., using Flush+
Reload. If probe is cached, the kernel address is invalid, if
probe is not cached, the kernel address is valid.
Root-Cause Hypothesis. Using performance counters, we
analyzed the behavior of FlushConflict. The CLFLUSH and
load access to the same address trigger a cache-line conflict
as also exploited in ZombieLoad [82]. Even though, at first,
the write to dummy seems unrelated, it is guaranteed to be
ordered with CLFLUSH [45] and hence influences the overall
timing of the executed code in the processor pipeline. Alterna-
tively, this line can also be removed entirely (depending on the
CPU) or replaced by a different method to add a delay, e.g., us-
ing a dummy loop. However, adding a serializing instruction,
such as a fence, breaks the attack, as it forces the CLFLUSH
to retire, preventing the cache-line conflict with the load. If
kernel is physically backed, we observe a page-table walk
(dtlb_load_misses.miss_causes_a_walk). If kernel is
not physically backed, we observe 2 page-table walks, i.e.,
the page-table walk is repeated. That is in agreement with
Canella et al. [16], showing that loads from non-present kernel
pages are re-issued. As this case takes longer [49] and faults
are only detected at the retirement of instructions, it gives
other out-of-order executed instructions more time to execute.
We hypothesize that if the kernel address is unmapped, the pro-
cessor has a long-enough speculation window to execute the
flush, write, and the last load. As a result of this, the last load
brings probe back to the cache. In the case of a mapped ker-
nel address, the processor detects the fault earlier and hence
stops the execution before the last load was issued. As a
result, probe is cached if kernel is not physically backed,
and not cached if kernel is physically backed. The ob-
served performance counters back this hypothesis. For an un-
mapped address, mem_load_retired_l3_miss shows fewer
events. However, the number of cycles spent waiting for mem-
ory (cycle_activity.cycles_l3_miss) is slightly higher.
This indicates that there are ongoing load instructions that
never retire, backing the hypothesis that the last load is only
executed transiently when the address is unmapped.
Applicability. We tested our microarchitectural KASLR
break on Intel CPUs from the 3rd to the 10th generation, i.e.,
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Table 5: The evaluated CPUs for the RDRAND covert channel.
CPU Setup Cross-HT Cross-CoreSpeed Error Speed Error
Intel Core i5-3230M Lab 133.3 bit/s 8.87 % 133.3 bit/s 0.05 %
Intel Core i3-5010U Lab 666.7 bit/s 0.30 % 333.3 bit/s 1.82 %
Intel Core i7-8565U Lab 400.0 bit/s 0.65 % 166.7 bit/s 0.63 %
Intel Core i9-9980HK Lab 500.0 bit/s 0.76 % 117.6 bit/s 9.25 %
Intel Core i3-1005G1 Lab 1000.0 bit/s 0.37 % 1000.0 bit/s 0.00 %
Intel Xeon E5-2686 v4 Cloud 500.0 bit/s 0.21 % 333.3 bit/s 2.48 %
Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3 Cloud 666.7 bit/s 2.64 % 95.2 bit/s 0.88 %
AMD Ryzen 5 2500U Lab 48.8 bit/s 2.80 % 48.8 bit/s 2.00 %
AMD Ryzen 5 3550H Lab 666.7 bit/s 2.10 % 500.0 bit/s 2.50 %
from Ivy Bridge to Comet Lake. As shown in Table 4, we used
desktop (Core), server (Xeon), and mobile (Celeron) CPUs.
In contrast, we experimentally verified that EchoLoad [16],
which works on a large range of Intel CPUs from 2010 to
2019, does not work on Ice Lake or Comet Lake. We con-
firm that the KASLR break is operating-system agnostic by
successfully mounting it on Linux and Windows 10.
In the case of KPTI, i.e., on CPUs that are not Meltdown-
resistant, the KASLR break detects the trampoline used to
switch to the kernel. Otherwise, if the CPU is Meltdown-
resistant or KPTI is disabled, the KASLR break detects the
start of the kernel image. As an unprivileged attacker can read
out the state of KPTI and whether the CPU is vulnerable to
Meltdown, the attacker always knows the start of the kernel
image. Moreover, as the kernel image itself is not randomized,
knowing the kernel version and the start of the kernel image
is sufficient to calculate the location of any kernel part.
Additionally, we tested the KASLR break by simulating
a realistic environment by artificially raising the pressure
on the CPU and memory subsystem using the stress utility.
We still observe success rates ranging from 92% to 99% for
the different microarchitectures (n = 100). Furthermore, we
verified the KASLR break in a cloud scenario by testing it on
an Intel Xeon Platinum 8124M in the AWS cloud.
Performance. On average, our KASLR break detects the
start of the kernel image within 136 ms (n = 1100) While not
the fastest microarchitectural KASLR break, it is on par with
other microarchitectural KASLR breaks [16].
6.3 RDRAND Covert Channel in the Cloud
Osiris discovered a timing leakage in the RDRAND instruction
on both Intel and AMD CPUs. In this section, we present
a cross-core covert channel based on these timing differ-
ences. We evaluate the capacity in a cross-thread scenario
(Section 6.3.2), and across cores and VMs (Section 6.3.3).
Finally, we analyze the leakage reason (Section 6.3.4).
6.3.1 Setup
The setup consists of a sender and a receiver application. In
our proof-of-concept implementation, sender and receiver are

















Figure 5: Using the RDRAND covert channel to send the
bit stream 100101101001011010010110... from one CPU
core to a different physical core (Intel Core i3-1005G1).
source such as the timestamp counter. To send a ‘1’-bit, the
sender repeatedly executes the RDRAND instruction for a fixed
time τ. To send a ‘0’-bit, the sender idles for τ. The receiver
measures the latency of the RDRAND instruction over a period
of τ. The latency directly corresponds to the sent bit, i.e., a
high latency is caused by a ‘1’-bit, and a low latency is caused
by a ‘0’-bit. We note that this setup is not optimal, as there
are more advanced techniques for synchronization, including
error correction [22, 64, 99]. However, our goal is to show the
feasibility and the noise-resistance of this channel, not how
far it can be optimized using better engineering.
6.3.2 Same-core Leakage
We evaluated an RDRAND-based covert channel across hy-
perthreads to estimate the maximum capacity of this chan-
nel. Note that the leakage in a cross-hyperthread channel is
boosted by port contention as well [7, 12]. Moreover, on Intel
CPUs, Intel documents that the microcode update preventing
SRBDS [77] serializes RDRAND executions on the same
core [47]. Hence, to rule out any influence of the microcode
fixes, we evaluated the channel with and without the active
patches. As AMD CPUs are not susceptible to SRBDS, there
is no microcode influence to rule out. As Table 5 shows,
we verified the covert channel on all Intel microarchitectures
since at least the Ivy Bridge microarchitecture, and also on
the AMD Zen and Zen+ microarchitecture. We achieve the
best results on the newest microarchitectures, with 1000 bit/s
(0 % error) on Intel and 666.7 bit/s (2.1 % error) on AMD.
While a same-core channel is usually irrelevant, it shows the
upper bound of the leakage achievable across cores.
6.3.3 Cross-core Leakage
In addition to the expected leakage across hyperthreads, we
evaluate the channel across physical cores.
Local Environment. Figure 5 shows a cross-core transmis-
sion in a local environment. While the signal is weaker than
in the cross-hyperthread scenario, we still manage to transmit
data reliably. As shown in Table 5, the channel achieves up to
1000 bit/s with a low error rate down to 0 %.
AWS Cloud. To further evaluate the applicability of the
covert channel in a real-world scenario, we mounted it be-
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Table 6: Transmission and error rates of state-of-the-art cross-
core covert channels sorted by transmission speed.
Covert channel (Element) Speed Error rate
Liu et al. [60] (L3) 600 kbit/s 1.00 %
Pessl et al. [75] (DRAM) 411 kbit/s 4.11 %
Maurice et al. [64] (L3) 362 kbit/s 0.00 %
Evtyushkin et al. [22] (RDSEED) 71 kbit/s 0.00 %
Ragab et al. [77] (CPUID) 24 kbit/s 5.00 %
Ours (RDRAND) 1000 bit/s 0.00 %
Maurice et al. [63] (L3) 751 bit/s 5.70 %
Wu et al. [99] (memory bus) 747 bit/s 0.09 %
Semal et al. [85] (memory bus) 480 bit/s 5.46 %
Schwarz et al. [83] (DRAM) 11 bit/s 0.00 %
tween two virtual machines running in the AWS cloud. To
ensure that we do not interfere with other users, we used a
dedicated C3 host with an Intel Xeon E5-2666 v3. We were
able to transmit 95.2 bit/s across two different virtual ma-
chines running on the same CPU with an error rate of 0.88 %.
Additionally, the host had a third virtual machine running to
simulate realistic noise. For completeness, we also verified
that the covert channel works across hyperthreads and cores
inside a single virtual machine in this setup (cf. Table 5).
Comparison to Other Cross-Core Covert Channels. Ta-
ble 6 shows a comparison of the transmission speed for
state-of-the-art cross-core covert channels. While the RDRAND-
based covert channel is much slower than modern cache-based
covert channels, it has two huge advantages. First, there are
no performance counters for the hardware random number
generator. Thus, this channel cannot be easily detected or pre-
vented by current approaches relying on performance coun-
ters [19, 40, 48, 72]. We also used the open-source HexPADS
framework [72] to verify that it cannot detect the covert chan-
nel. Second, in contrast to memory-based covert channels,
this channel is agnostic to any typical system noise caused by
memory accesses on the sender core. As typical workloads
do not execute RDRAND in a high frequency, we do not see a
high impact on the transmission rate, even for high workloads.
We verified that by running the Linux tool stress for both
the CPU and the memory on the sender core does not prevent
the covert channel. Even in this scenario, with an extremely
high load of 100 % on the sibling hyperthread, we manage to
transmit 500.0 bit/s with an error rate of 7.34 %.
Furthermore, as our covert channel does not rely on the
memory subsystem, defenses proposed against cache at-
tacks [59, 76, 96, 97, 104, 105] do not prevent our channel.
Even existing partitioning features, such as Intel CAT, which
can be used to prevent cache-based cross-VM covert chan-
nels [58] do not affect the RDRAND-based covert channel.
6.3.4 Explanation for RDRAND Side Channel
As the hardware random number generator is shared across
all cores, simultaneous use by multiple cores leads to con-
tention. Hence, as with many cross-core covert channels [22,
63, 75, 99], the root cause is the contention of a resource
shared across cores, such as the L3 cache or the memory bus.
However, in contrast to previous covert channels, we could not
identify any performance counters related to RDRAND. While
this makes the analysis more difficult, it also increases the
stealthiness of the channel, as it cannot be detected easily.
While previous work showed that the RDSEED instruc-
tion can exhaust the hardware random-number generator
(RNG) [22], the RDRAND instruction has not been analyzed
for side-channel leakage. Moreover, Evtyushkin et al. [22]
only exploited an architectural value, i.e., a cleared carry flag,
indicating that the RNG is exhausted, and not differences in
the execution time. At first glance, it might seem obvious that
RDRAND also suffers from exhaustion as it fundamentally relies
on the RDSEED instruction. RDSEED is quickly exhausted, as it
provides the randomness directly from the hardware element.
However, Evtyushkin et al. [22] observed that RDRAND pro-
vides the numbers from a pseudo-RNG and can thus provide
continuous streams of numbers. We confirm that the RDRAND-
based leakage is not due to exhaustion. While measuring the
timing differences, the instruction does not indicate that the
RNG is exhausted, i.e., the carry flag was always set [44].
We additionally ruled out the microcode updates preventing
CrossTalk [77] as a cause for the timing differences. While
these updates reduce the bandwidth of RDRAND across hyper-
threads due to serialization, they do not affect the cross-core
behavior [47]. We verified that by successfully mounting the
covert channel with and without the microcode update, and
also by disabling the mitigation on patched systems via the
IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL model-specific register.
7 Discussion
With Osiris, we present a generic approach for detecting
timing-based side channels. Our current prototype still has
several limitations preventing it from finding even more side
channels. However, these are not conceptual limitations. It
would merely require a lot more engineering to solve them.
In the current version, we only consider side channels where
the timing difference is around 100 cycles. Any side chan-
nel with a smaller timing difference, e.g., Flush+Flush [35],
CacheBleed [102] or the AMD way predictor [56], is cur-
rently not reported. One practical reason is that Osiris runs
on a commodity Linux system, where it is tough to elimi-
nate all influences on the measurement. Even when isolating
cores, several microarchitectural elements are shared across
all cores, there are still remaining interrupts, and the power
management of the CPU can change the CPU frequency, e.g.,
for thermal reasons. Hence, to reliably detect small timing
USENIX Association 30th USENIX Security Symposium    1427
differences, Osiris would have to run on a custom operating
system designed for microarchitectural research, such as Sushi
Roll [26]. In line with related work [27, 30], our prototype
only considers sequences consisting of one instruction. As
a consequence, eviction-based side channels such as Evict+
Reload, Evict+Time, Prime+Probe, or Reload+Refresh are
not detected. However, related work [34, 94, 95] showed that
eviction strategies can also be found automatically. Moreover,
for specific problems, the search space can be reduced by mu-
tating existing instruction sequences (similar to Medusa [65])
or instruction operands instead of randomly generating them.
Therefore, Osiris can be augmented by these techniques to
also find eviction-based side channels and support multi-
instruction sequences (e.g., fault suppression). Furthermore,
using performance counters, power (RAPL), and debug in-
terfaces (Intel VISA/ITP-XDP) as feedback mechanisms, the
fuzzer could monitor resource usage and microarchitectural
conflicts to guide the sequence generation process. This would
allow finding eviction-based channels: (i) Start with multiple
loads as a reset sequence, (ii) Mutate the loaded addresses
while maximizing (guidance) the cache miss count until a
time difference is detected.
Still, despite these current limitations of the prototype,
Osiris discovered novel timing-based side channels within
hours of runtime. These side channels led to the discovery of a
new microarchitectural KASLR break, a previously unknown
cross-VM covert channel, and an improvement for transient-
execution attacks. Hence, we argue that Osiris is a useful tool
for automating the search for timing-based side channels that
can also be used by CPU vendors to detect such side channels
introduced by new ISA extensions automatically.
Also, Osiris can be extended to other architectures, e.g.,
ARMv8, with relative ease. To this end, the main parts that
need to be adapted are the code generation stage, particularly
the offline phase to construct possible instruction variants,
and the execution stage. The current implementation of Osiris
uses inlined instructions to measure the execution time, which
would need to be changed for the target architecture (see
Section 4). However, this task can be simplified by refining
the current approach to use other timing primitives [55].
8 Conclusion
Our findings illustrate that prior side channels targeted only a
subset of many micro-architectural changes. We show several
additional, undocumented instruction side effects that attack-
ers can leverage for security-critical side channels. This has se-
vere implications to existing and future side-channel defenses,
as each of them is based on a specific threat model that frames
(known) attack capabilities. We, therefore, see our proposed
fuzzing-based technique as the first systematic, generic, and
automated attempt to fast-forward the arms race of detecting
(and then, ultimately, defending against) such side channels.
The newly discovered side channels and their application to
three use cases raise our confidence that Osiris can indeed
support this endeavor. When used during the CPU design
stage, Osiris helps to eliminate—or at least to document—
side channels early on. For this reason, we released Osiris as
an open-source tool.
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A Clustering Results
Table 7 shows the clustering results for the CPUs on which
Osiris ran. Osiris found multiple thousand side channels that
were clustered based on the instruction extension of Seqtrigger,
Seqmeasure, and Seqreset, resulting in 100 to 200 clusters. How-
ever, as Seqreset is typically not involved in the actual leakage,
clustering based on the instruction extension of only Seqtrigger
and Seqmeasure results in a smaller number of clusters.
Table 7: Cluster Results For Intel Microarchitectures.
CPU Name Found Extension Seqmeasure-Seqtrigger only
Intel Core i7-9750H 68 597 186 clusters 16 clusters
Intel Core i5-4690 51 468 168 clusters 19 clusters
Intel Core i7-9700K 27 512 104 clusters 26 clusters
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